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The Effect of Jury Size on the Probability
of Conviction: An Evaluation of Williams
v. Florida
I. INTRODUCTION
M ANY FACTORS are relevant to an analysis of a judicial decision.
Some of the more important approaches emphasize: (1) how
the new legal rules are related to preexisting law; (2) the personal
or psychological reasons for the judge's decision;1 (3) the institu-
tional context of the court, in an effort to elucidate important
strengths and weaknesses in the legal system as a whole;' (4) non-
scientific appraisals of the practical, social effects of the legal rules
1 There are many problems involved in relating the judge's personality, history,
cognitive structure, etc., to the decision he reaches in a particular case. Present models
of individual behavior are not sufficiently sophisticated to deal with such broad questions.
Even if there were a model that adequately described the judge, there would be enor-
mous problems involved in gathering the personal data necessary to use the model in a
given case. The problems that arise in both model-construction and data-gathering
are discussed in Lewis, Systems Theory and Judicial Behavioralism, 21 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 361 (1970), which focuses particularly on a study of Justice Black.
-2The institutional context of the court can be analyzed from a number of perspec-
tives. See generally L. VON BERTALANFFY, GENERAL SYSTEMS THEORY; FOUNDA-
TIONS, DEVELOPMENT, APPLICATIONS (1969). One of the issues in this category
is the sufficiency of the adversary proceeding. The presentations are made by two or
more lawyers before judges, and rarely are any of these persons expert in fields other
than the law. The efficacy of such a format is questionable, but one cannot hastily con-
clude that another body would be more capable. One alternative is to leave more de-
cision making to the legislature, but there is no guarantee that a legislature will make
an intelligent investigation before it acts. And even when such an investigation is made,
there are strong tendencies for legislators to disregard the results and follow either
their own visceral feelings or the most expedient political route. See, e.g., J. KAPLAN,
MARIJUANA: THE NEW PROIBMON at ix-xii (1970).
Legal problems are often treated superficially, and this seems partially the fault of
the law schools. The schools are one of the most important institutions in the legal
system, but they provide little education beyond the mere art of manipulating legal
rules. Many persons have suggested that they should become more social science ori-
ented to remedy this deficiency. See, e.g., S. Fox, SCIENCE AND JusTIcE (1968);
Derham, Legal Education - A Challenge to the Profession, 43 AuSTL L.J. 530
(1969); Traynor, What Domesday Books for Emerging Law?, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1105
(1968). Some law schools have already initiated new courses that depart radically
from the narrow, traditional approach. For example, Yale Law School has instituted
a program of Law and Modernization whose goal is to combine political, social, and
economic developments into a policy of social change through the use of law. See Yale
University, Bulletin of Yale University: Yale Law School (1970).
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of the case and of alternative legal rules;3 and (5) scientific and
quasi-scientific analyses of the effects of alternative legal positions. 4
The case of Williams v. Florida5 - which held that a jury of
six persons is constitutionally sufficient in a criminal trial - can be
fruitfully analyzed from most of these perspectives. Only the first
approach (a comparison of the decision with preexisting law)
would be of little value. The issue of jury size is a relatively iso-
lated one and does not fit easily into a general legal doctrine. More-
over, because the Court squarely rejected earlier cases which said
that 12 jurors were required by the Constitution," there is no room
to reconcile the Williams holding with other decisions. For any of
the other approaches, Williams provides excellent material for an
informative study. Statements peripheral to the case shed some
light on the values of the Justices that were not articulated in the
actual opinion, but which probably affected their decisionsT Also,
3 This category refers to any hypothesis about the impact of the decision that seems
plausible but does not rely on empirical data. These hypotheses are simple to create
since they require no experimental work and draw only from one's intuitive notions
about human behavior. It is unwise to base a decision on such superficial grounds.
For example, the longstanding American dogma about the effects of pornography has
recently been undercut by an empirical study. Kant & Goldstein, Pornography, 4
PSYCHOL. TODAY, Dec. 1970, at 58. Actual behavior may often be the opposite of one's
intuitive conceptions. See generally Moynihan, Eliteland, 4 PSYCHOL TODAY, Sept.
1970, at 35.
4For example, instead of guessing at the effects of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), on the police and on judicial administration, Stuart Nagel has studied the ac-
tual impact of the decision on these institutions. See Nagel, Testing the Effects of Ex-
cluding Illegally Seized Evidence, 1965 WIS. L. REV. 283. See also A Study of the
California Penalty Jury in First-Degree-Murder Cases, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1297 (1969)
(special edition). For a general discussion of such empirical testing, see THE IMPACT
OF SUPREME COURT DEcisIONs (T. Becker ed. 1969).
An appraisal of the role of the social sciences in the legal process is difficult These
disciplines rarely provide the conclusive, quantitative results typical of the natural sci-
ences. It is still an open question whether the problems in analyzing human behavior
pose ultimate differences from those arising in the natural sciences. Ernest Nagel,
among others, believes that the difference is only one of the degree of quantitative com-
plexity, rather than unavoidable, qualitative differences. See generally E. NAGEL, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE; PROBLEMS IN THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION
(1961); A. KAPLAN, THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY; METHODOLOGY FOR BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCE (1964).
5 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
6 In order to hold that the sixth amendment allowed the six-man jury, the Court
rejected six centuries of common law tradition and numerous Supreme Court pronounce-
ments. Id. at 125-29 (Harlan, J., concurring). For previous Court decisions embody-
ing the prior law, see Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930); Rassmussen
v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 519 (1905); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 586
(1900); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349 (1898).
7 There is some indication that a primary reason for the decision was to lessen the
states' burden of maintaining their systems of criminal administration. Chief Justice
Burger believes that "jury trials [slow] the wheels of justice" and apparently supports
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the quality of the analysis accorded the six-man jury problem raises
questions about the adequacy of our legal institutions to deal with
difficult behavioral questions.8
Yet the fifth approach, a scientific appraisal of the potential
social impact of Williams, is probably the most important 9 A func-
tional analysis of jury size is a prerequisite to a practical assessment
of Williams. Such an analysis is equally crucial to the strictly legal
issue because the Court explicitly held that the constitutionality of
the six-man jury would turn on the operational importance of the
their abolition. N.Y. Times, Sept 8, 1970, at 1, col. 3. But cf. The Plain Dealer
(Cleveland, Ohio), Nov. 15, 1970, at 11, col. 1.
8 The question here is whether the Justices, their clerks, and the attorneys are capable
of correctly using available knowledge. The Court's analysis of the behavioral problem
in Williams - whether a six-man jury would return the same verdicts as a 12-man
jury - did not make full use of available theory or data. See notes 23-31 infra & ac-
companying text. The Court's use of statistics has often been open to criticism. For
example, an explanation of the defects in the Court's guidelines for jury discrimination
cases is given in Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury
Discrimination Cases, 80 HAiV. L REV. 338 (1966).
The quality of the arguments presented by the attorneys in Williams raises further
questions about the institutional context of the Court. Counsel for Johnny Williams
allocated a little over one page to the constitutionality of the six-man jury and did not
intimate that a jury's size might affect its verdict. No functional comments whatsoever
were made. See Brief for Petitioner 8-9, Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
Without proof of a verdict differential, there is no apparent prejudice to the defendant,
and consequently his claim could only rest on history.
The six-man jury issue was not even mentioned in an amicus curiae brief. It is
especially odd that the NAACP did not challenge the smaller jury. With a six-man
jury, racial discrimination in the selection of jurors becomes even more difficult to prove
than it presently is. Since only half as many jurors are used, statistical fluctuations be-
come more pronounced and actual discrimination requires showings of very egregious
imbalance. Cf. Finkelstein, supra.
This lack of attention to the question has at least two possible explanations. One
can be drawn from Justice Harlan's belief that no one thought the Court would find
the six-man jury constitutional. See 399 U.S. at 122 (concurring opinion). If he was
correct, no one would have been motivated to investigate the question in any depth.
The other explanation points to the deficiencies in the traditional skills of the lawyer
in dealing with behavioral problems. This explanation places the ultimate criticism
on the legal system as a whole.
9 Any one problem in the analysis of a case is closely intertwined with all the others.
The impact of a decision is never independent of the institutional context of the Court,
the law itself, or innumerable other considerations. To focus on one aspect alone al-
ways raises the problem of reductionism, and some scientists believe that the failure to
countenance the entire whole can only produce colorable conclusions. See, e.g., L VON
BERTALANFFY, supra note 2. Nevertheless, the scientist always must steer between the
overly narrow focus which loses its relevance and the overly broad focus that can lead
to no substantial conclusions. It seems fully justified to concentrate on a functional
evaluation of the six-man jury. The effect of Williams on the accused is certainly broad
enough to be valuable, yet sufficiently defined to allow meaningful conclusions. More-
over, a functional analysis of the reduced jury was a critical element in the legal decision
itself. See text accompanying note 72 infra.
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number of jurors:1" If size played a relevant role in view of the
purposes of the jury, 12 would remain the constitutional require-
ment. Thus, the Williams test gives due weight to the importance
of function and demands a thorough evaluation of how the verdicts
of six- and 12-man juries would compare. In its evaluation of this
question, the Court concluded that there would be no difference be-
tween the two. Consequently, the smaller number fulfilled the pur-
poses of the right to a jury trial as well as the traditional, larger
jury, and was found constitutional.
Accepting the constitutional test enunciated by the Court," the
threshold question is whether the Williams analysis of jury size is
sufficiently accurate from a functional perspective. The present
study answers this question in the negative. Neither the reasoning
of the opinion nor the references relied upon support the Court's
conclusion that either jury would return the same verdicts. More-
over, additional empirical evidence, not taken into account in the
opinion, implies that the smaller jury will indeed convict different
defendants. Because the constitutionality of the six-man jury rested
upon the Court's incorrect analysis, the Williams holding is clearly
threatened.
In reappraising the six-man jury problem, a brief discussion will
first be made of the elements of the jury that are relevant to its role
in the legal system. Next, the Court's evaluation of how jury size
affects this role will be criticized. After pointing out the deficiencies
in the Williams opinion, a more rigorous, scientific comparison of
the two kinds of juries will be made. Because this analysis will
demonstrate a meaningful difference in the behavior of the two
juries, the study will conclude with a reexamination of the narrower
legal issue - whether the reduced jury satisfies the Court's test of
constitutionality.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF
THE JURY AND THE IMPORTANCE OF JURY SIZE
The Supreme Court rejected the force of common law history
as an absolute command in Williams and instead directed its inquiry
10 See text accompanying note 72 infra.
11 This study will show that Williams was decided erroneously under a correct ap-
plication of the Court's own constitutional test. One could go further and dispute the
test enunciated by the Court, but that step will not be taken here. Among other reasons
for this reluctance is the problem of the Court's broad discretion in choosing tests. Once
a constitutional question arises, the Justices are essentially unrestrained in deciding
which of the numerous types of tests to apply. For a further discussion of this point,
see note 74 infra & accompanying text.
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to a functional appraisal of jury size. If the six-man jury performed
differently than a jury of 12, its constitutionality would turn on two
further questions. First, did this difference mean that the smaller
number frustrated the purposes of the jury, or was the change un-
objectionable? Second, if the reduction in size did derogate from
the purposes of the jury, did the Constitution alone demand that
the traditional size be retained? Before these questions can be re-
solved, the role of the jury in the legal system must be defined. In
this section, the Supreme Court's view of the purposes of a jury trial
will be examined. Then, the way the Court evaluated the six-man
jury in light of these purposes will be critiqued.
A simplistic adumbration of the jury's function would be mis-
leading because of the conceptual difficulties that surround the prob-
lem. Even from a strictly legal perspective, a number of constitu-
tional rules provide a web of restraints that are relevant to the jury
in criminal cases." Yet, as complicated as are the legal factors, the
philosophical and behavioral problems are much more difficult.
Jurisprudential ideas about the jury as a decision-maker have run
the entire range 6f possibilities. The jury has been described as any-
thing from a sacrosanct body of rational factfinders to a group of
unpredictable, irrational commoners.' 3 Unfortunately because there
12 In a state criminal trial, these rules have their origin in the sixth and 14th amend-
ments. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Bumper v. North Carolina,
391 U.S. 543, 545 (1968).
13 According to the classical notion, the jury observes the trial, makes logical con-
clusions regarding the evidence, and then applies the relevant legal rules to those con-
clusions. See generally J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (1827).
Modem psychologists, however, place less emphasis on the rational, conscious side of
man. See generally C. HALL & G. LINDZEY, THEORIES OF PERSONALITY (1957).
For an explication of the jury from a more realistic modern stance, see Broeder, The
Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. C. L. REV. 386, 387-401 (1954).
One school believes the jury is incapable of using the law in a "proper," rational
manner:
There are therefore three unknown elements which enter into the general
verdict: (a) the facts; (b) the law; (c) the application of the law to the
facts. And it is clear that the verdict is liable to three sources of error, cor-
responding to these three elements .... The general verdict is as inscrutable
and essentially mysterious as the judgment which issued from the ancient
oracles of Delphi....
As to the second element... the law, it is a matter upon which the jury
is necessarily ignorant. The jurors are taken from the body of the country,
and it is safe to say that the last man who would be called or allowed to sit
would be a lawyer. They are second-hand dealers in law, and must get it
from a judge... Indeed, can anything be more fatuous than the expectation
that the law which the judge so carefully ... expounds to the layman in the
jury box will become operative in their minds in its true form? Sunderland,
Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253, 258-59 (1920).
English and American literature are replete with tales of the jury, and a large por-
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are few thorough studies of the jury,' 4 there are no conclusive
grounds for adopting any one particular view.
In the course of deciding actual cases, the Supreme Court has
avoided being caught in most of the perplexing "extralegal" prob-
lems. It is possible to extract from past decisions a few concise fac-
tors that the Court has deemed essential to the jury's place in the
legal process. Of course, the ultimate function of the jury is to re-
solve the question of the defendant's guilt. And a jury is preferred
over other means because it provides the defendant with "an in-
estimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor
and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge."' 5 This safe-
guard is secured by the "interposition between the accused and his
accuser of the common sense judgment of a group of laymen, and
in the community participation and shared responsibility that results
from that group's determination of guilt or innocence.' '1 6  When a
change in the number of jurors is made, the Court believes that the
jury's task of resolving guilt is unimpaired if a few features are
protected.' 7  These critical factors are: (1) the requirement of
group deliberation; (2) the prevention of outside intimidation; and
(3) the assurance of a fair possibility of obtaining a representative
cross-section of the community. 8
Williams concludes that the change to six jurors does not affect
these factors and that smaller juries would return the same verdicts
as traditional juries. Several theoretical reasons are given to sup-
port this conclusion, and it is also claimed that empirical evidence
corroborates the theoretical arguments. But an examination of the
opinion will show that the Court's conclusion is unwarranted. First,
tion of these reflect a very cynical impression. See, e.g., Carroll, Trial of the Knave of
Hearts, in LAW IN AcTIoN 491 (A. Curiae ed. 1947).
14 The most extensive study of the jury was performed at the University of Chicago.
See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966), reviewed, Kaplan, 115
U. PA. L. REv. 475 (1967). A comment on jury research is made in Erlanger, Jury
Research in America, 4 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 345 (1970).
15 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
16 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
17 The Court's view of the purpose of the jury will be accepted as final. The reluc-
tance to criticize that view is based on several considerations. Even on the basis of the
Court's interpretation, it can be shown that Williams was decided wrongly. Also, the
principal aspects of the jury that are relied upon in this study are well entrenched (for
example, the idea that the verdict should be representative of community thought).
In addition, a complete explication of the jury's role opens a morass for which there
presently are no final answers. See notes 13-14 supra & accompanying text. Conse-
quently, a criticism of the Court's position might not lead to a better resolution of the
question.
18 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
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the Court considers whether the probability of finding at least one
juror who insists on acquittal is greater with the larger jury, and
consequently the chances of escaping conviction are greater. The
Court rebuts this argument by asserting that the opposite is equally
true - the probability of finding one person determined to convict
is also greater with 12 jurors, so acquittal likewise seems more diffi-
cult to obtain."9 The Court's reasoning has a superficial appeal, but
it is true only if the available jurors2° are equally divided on the
question of the defendant's guilt. In the more likely situation
where the available jurors are not equally divided,2" the probabilities
of selecting an innocent-prone and a guilty-prone juror are not the
same, as implicitly assumed in Williams. The Court's reasoning is
completely undercut by this fact. Moreover, the compound proba-
bility of selecting several jurors of one leaning or the other varies as
the size of the jury is varied. Consequently, it seems that the over-
all probabilities of conviction and acquittal are changed when the
number of jurors is reduced."
More important than this error in logic is the Court's failure to
draw on the available empirical evidence describing the behavior of
small groups in the process of seeking consensus.2 3  There is little
validity to ostensibly logical views of jury behavior in the absence of
empirical verification.24  Williams does purport to rely upon several
"studies" to infer "there is no discernible difference between the re-
sults reached by the two different-sized juries,"' 5 but the references
cited20 do not support this conclusion. In one of the articles, the
clerk of a civil court summed up his general impressions and stated
that the verdicts of the smaller juries " 'in practically every case
19 Id. at 101.
20 For a discussion of who is an available juror, see note 43 infra.
2 1 In the University of Chicago jury study, the petit jury was equally divided before
deliberation only 10 times out of more than 200 cases. These figures imply that the
available jurors are usually divided unequally as well. (Various statistical methods
could be used to prove this conclusion, but a proof will not be included here.)
2 2 The probablistic impact of the six-man jury (as to likelihood of conviction and
acquittal) is fully explained at notes 35-63 infra & accompanying text.
2 3 See articles cited notes 50-59 infra.
2 4 See notes 3-4 supra.
25 399 U.S. at 101 (footnote omitted).
26 Cronin, Six-Member Juries in District Courts, 2 BosT. B.J. 27 (1958); New
Jersey Experiments with Six-Man Jury, 9 BULL. OF THE SECTION OF JUD. AD. OF THE
ABA (May 1966); Phillips, A Jury of Six in All Cases, 30 CONN. B.J. 354 (1956);
Six-Member Juries Tried in a Massachusetts District Court, 42 J. AM. JUD. SOC'Y 138
(1958); Tamm, The Five-Man Civil Jury: A Proposed Constitutional Amendment, 51
GEO. L.J. 120, 134-36 (1962); Wiehl, The Six Man Jury, 4 GONZAGA L. REv. 35,
40-41 (1968).
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[werel fairly comparable to those of the twelve member juries and
by the same token they [were] just as quick to find for the defen-
dants.' ",27 Of course, such a totally unscientific opinion is of no
merit in a rigorous attempt to compare the behavior of the two
juries. It is devoid of any records of trial results and reflects noth-
ing more than the impressions of the court clerk. The other articles
cited discuss the obvious fact that reduced juries are somewhat
cheaper and more expeditious, but they provide no analysis of the
verdicts that are returned.
Finally, the Court argues that reduction of the number of jurors
does not affect the outcome since the proportion of jurors that the
defendant must persuade in order to escape conviction would be the
same with each size jury.29 Again, this reasoning implicitly assumes
that the available jurors are equally divided on the issue of the de-
fendant's guilt. In the much more common case where the jurors
are not equally divided, a variation in jury size affects the probabili-
ties of obtaining the different proportions of favorable and unfavor-
able jurors.30 Because the probabilities of obtaining different ratios
of conviction-prone jurors are changed when the jury size is changed,
the Court's own logic (which assumes that the verdict is determined
by proportion alone) implies that the outcome of the trial is affected
as well.
In another aspect of the problem, the Court dismisses the ques-
tion of the representational quality of the jury. It states that a jury
of 12 does not ensure representation of all voices in the community,
and consequently a jury of six should not be much worse.31 The
failure to investigate the effect of diminished representation more
deeply is a fatal defect in Williams. It will be shown that the
change in representation is crucial to the defendant's fate; this factor
must be precisely taken into account before valid conclusions can
be made about the importance of jury size.
In addition to the behavioral issues that were raised in Williams,
there are many Supreme Court decisions concerning the right to a
2 7Tamm, supra note 26, at 135 (quoting from a letter to Judge Tamm).
2 8 Even if the court clerk had compiled statistics comparing the verdicts of the two
juries, any conclusions based on such data would be very dubious. To use such data
properly, one would have to know exactly what differences existed between the trials
that took place in each of the two categories. Problems of ceteris paribus would con-
taminate any inferences, unless it were shown that the trials were "sufficiently" com-
parable.
29 399 U.S. 101 n.49.
30 See notes 21-22 supra & accompanying text.
31 399 U.S. at 102.
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jury representative of the community3 2 and to a fair trial.33  The
opinion does not refer to any of these cases, but the reason for this
neglect seems rather dear. The Court believed the six- and 12-man
juries would return the same verdicts; consequently, no harmful con-
sequences could befall the defendant from the reduction in jury size.
Unless the six-man jury increases a defendant's chances of convic-
tion, he has no claim of prejudice to a constitutional right analogous
to the rights protected in these other cases.34 These cases are rele-
vant only if it is first shown that the smaller jury functions different-
ly, and to the detriment of the defendant.
To summarize the Court's analysis of jury size, one can only say
that the reasoning is superficial and the conclusions are unsupported.
Consequently, an ab initio study of the behavioral issue must be
made. This will be done in the next section, and the constitutional-
ity of the six-man jury will be reassessed in section IV.
III. EVALUATION OF THE PERFORMANCE OF
THE SIX-MAN JURY
The behavioral question before the Court in Williams was very
narrow. If both a six-man jury and a 12-man jury were hypotheti-
cally used in each criminal trial, would the verdicts ever differ?
Many difficulties would impede a general study of how the final
verdict is related to the trial, but a relatively simple model can deal
with the concise question in Williams. This simplification is pos-
sible because the most complex facets of the jury can be held con-
32 See, e.g., Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 331-38 (1970) and the cases
cited therein.
83 See, e.g., Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
3 4 Usually these cases do not refer to an actual increase in the chances of conviction,
but just vaguely refer to the requirements of a fair trial. The difficulty in showing the
impact on the defendant is a prime cause of the Court's nebulous approach in these cases.
This difficulty is discussed in Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 578-80 (1965) (Warren,
C.J., concurring).
Actual harm to the defendant probably does not have to be shown in cases of jury
representation. Although a defendant has no right to representation of all classes on
his particular jury, he does have the right to a jury selected from a general pool where
no class has been deliberately excluded or invidiously under-represented. See, e.g.,
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). Since the leading case of Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), a violation of this right invalidates a conviction. That
Court may have believed minority defendants were subjected to an unjustly high chance
of conviction, but this possibility has never been relied upon as the grounds for reversal.
A jury pool can also be challenged on the grounds that it was selected in a manner
such that the probabilities of conviction were higher than with a more representative
pool. See Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 278-81 (1947) (a claim that the "blue-
ribbon" jury was conviction-prone was considered a valid challenge, but was rejected
there as unproven).
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stant while only the size of the jury is varied. The advantages of
this approach are most easily appreciated if the jury is first discussed
in a very general context, and then in the limited context of size
alone.
The broadest possible inquiry would question whether the jury
is really a desirable part of our legal process .3 An answer to this
problem would require very accurate knowledge of the jury's deci-
sion-making function and of its other short and long term social
effects.36 The complexities involved in such an unrestricted evalua-
tion become quite clear if the adjudication process is viewed as a
composite of several phases: (1) the events that transpire within
the courtroom, including the law expounded by the judge; (2) the
individual jurors' reactions to these courtroom proceedings; and
(3) the establishment of a verdict by deliberation. As to the first
of these phases, there is clearly a connection between what has oc-
curred outside the court (the alleged crime) and the trial proceed-
ings themselves, but little can be said about the particulars of that
connection.37  As to the second phase, the jurors react to the events
in the courtroom in essentially unknown ways.38  Because our pres-
ent knowledge inadequately describes what happens in these first
3 5 This question has played a part in various decisions. See, e.g., Baldwin v. New
York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
36 The significance of short term effects (problems of "behaving") and long term
effects (problems of "becoming") are discussed in Gerard, Neurophysiology: An In-
tegration (molecules, neurons, and behavior), in 3 HANDBOOK OF PHYSIOLOGY 1919
(J. Field ed. 1960).
37 One problem in creating past reality is introduced by the inherent inaccuracies
of our senses. Heinlein's "fair witness" (who is trained to be a completely objective,
error-free purveyor of observed phenomena) may represent man's potential, see R.
HEINLEIN, STRANGER IN A STRANGE LAND 98-100 (Berkeley Medallion ed. 1968),
but most persons today are infected with the tendency to misperceive their surroundings.
Marshall, The Evidence, 2 PSYCHOL. TODAY, Feb. 1969, at 48. See also Warren &
Warren, Auditory Illusions and Confusions, 223 SCIENTIFIc AMERICAN, Dec. 1970,
at 30.
There is also an ontological problem because what happens in court is simply not
going to be the same as what actually happened. There is obviously a difference be-
tween the sensory stimuli that impinge on a person present at an actual event and those
that impinge on one who observes a courtroom reconstruction of that event. The ulti-
mate effect this difference has on the juror's opinion of guilt is unpredictable.
Another difficulty is the problem of conveying the nonphysical aspects of the case
(such as emotion) into the courtroom. In one unusual approach to the problem, a
court held that an attorney has the right, and possibly the duty, to cry during the trial.
Ferguson v. Moore, 98 Tenn. 342, 350-52, 39 S.W. 341, 343 (1897).
For a discussion and references regarding recreation of history in the trial court, see
In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453, 462 n.21 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 858 (1947);
United States v. Rubenstein, 151 F.2d 915, 920 n.4 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
766 (1945).
38 Cf. notes 1, 13 supra and note 41 infra.
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two phases, there is a great deal of uncertainty in the adjudication
process. It is impossible to make definitive conclusions about the
overall behavior of the jury, or about the factors that determine the
verdict. But the third phase, jury deliberation, is much simpler, and
there are studies available that describe what happens during this
stage of the process0 9
These difficulties are raised only to underscore a single point.
The impact of the Williams variable, the number of jurors, can be
evaluated accurately without reference to the first two phases of the
adjudicative process. Because the task here is to analyze the jury's
reaction to the courtroom proceedings alone,40 the problems inher-
ent in correlating the first phase to the out-of-court events are ir-
relevant. The sole aim is to show what differences might arise in
the verdicts if a jury of six rather than 12 were used. Nothing in
the trial itself is changed, other than the size of the jury. Ultimate-
ly, it might be very informative to correlate verdicts to the "real
world" events surrounding the alleged crime, but a complete evalua-
tion of Williams does not require such thoroughness. Also, differ-
ences in the six-man case can be examined independently of how
each juror arrives at his predeliberation opinion of the defendant's
guilt (the second phase) because an individual juror's predelibera-
tion reaction to the trial is not affected by the size of the jury.41 A
juror would carry the same feelings into the jury room regardless of
39 See notes 49-61 infra & accompanying text.
40 The term "trial" will be used in this study to denote any one set of proceedings
observed by the jury. Thus, a trial is defined to include only those events in the court-
room that affect the jurors' opinions. It is not meant to include anything that occurs
after the jurors depart for deliberation. This definition is more limited than the gen-
ral meaning of the word, which would include everything that happens through the
pronouncement of the verdict.
By concentrating on one unique set of courtroom events, a predictive model can at-
tain a high degree of scientific merit. The entire ceteris paribus problem is circum-
vented by this approach. In the terminology of the three-phase formulation, all the
difficulties of the first phase have been avoided by simply keeping the events constant
for each application of the model. The way in which the trial proceedings are related
to the alleged crime is not a factor.
41 Te juror's initial reaction, before deliberation, is assumed to be a function only
of his mental constitution and what happens in the courtroom. The juror's feelings
towards the defendant's guilt or innocence, at the moment he enters the jury room, is
taken to be independent of the size of the jury.
Even this apparently self-evident statement has several assumptions buried within
it. Attorneys might alter their behavior (consciously or otherwise) before the smaller
jury. Likewise, the witnesses might be affected by the smaller juries in some subtle
way, with a consequent modification of their behavior while testifying. The juror him-
self might experience a slightly different emotional state just because he is a member
of a six-man group, rather than a 12-man group. And this difference could manifest
itself by affecting his reaction to the trial. All such effects are assumed to be statistically
insignificant, although this study does not test this assumption empirically.
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the total number of jurors. Thus, the factors in the first two phases
can, and must, be considered constant in assessing the importance of
a change in the jury size alone. If the effects that ensue solely from
a reduction in the number of jurors is shown, the impact of Wil-
liams will be perfectly defined - regardless of how the in-court
proceedings are related to their historical referent, or what may be
the psychological basis for a juror's reaction to the trial.
The framework for analysis, then, is simple. A criminal trial
takes place, and two questions are asked: What would be the out-
come if a jury of six had sat in judgment? And what would be the
outcome if a jury of 12 had sat in judgment? First, a model of the
jury will be developed that copes with each unique trial.' To em-
phasize that specific trials are being examined initially, the subscript
"t" will be used with each variable. After the model for the indi-
vidual case is completed, the impact of the change in jury size on
defendants as a whole will be assessed. Very briefly, the model will
tie the courtroom proceedings to the final verdicts in three distinct
steps: (1) a parameter will be used to characterize the jurors' re-
actions to the trial and statistically describe the petit jury just prior
to deliberation; (2) an analysis of jury deliberation will be made
on the basis of empirical studies; and (3) this analysis will be
applied to the predeliberation description of the jury to predict the
verdicts.
A. The Relationship Between the Trial and the
Predeliberation fury
If each potential juror4" had actually observed the trial, a certain
fraction of them would be inclined to consider the defendant guilty
at the conclusion of the courtroom proceedings, immediately prior
to deliberation. This fraction will be denoted by ft.44  Conversely,
1-ft is the fraction of the entire pool that would be inclined to be-
lieve the defendant innocent just before deliberation begins.4" This
42 The term "trial," as used in this study, is defined in note 40 supra.
43 The jury pool spoken of here is not strictly the number of persons eligible to
serve on the jury. It includes only those persons who would not be excused or elimi-
nated during the voir dire examination for the particular prosecution being considered.
44 The variable f, does not involve the difficulties that usually apply to behavioral
concepts. See generally A. KAPLAN, supra note 4, at 34-83. It is a statistical fraction
that theoretically could be obtained by counting heads.
The only assumption necessary for this study is that an f1 value exists, at least in
the abstract. It is not necessary to be able to measure an ft value in reality. See text
accompanying notes 76-79 infra.
45 Only the slightest predilection towards conviction or acquittal is sufficient for this
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characterization of the complete group of potential jurors is also
sufficient to depict the petit jury because the petit jury is simply a
statistical subset of these potential jurors. Thus, the single parame-
ter, ft, correlates the trial itself to a description of the jury's leanings
before it begins deliberation (within the statistical limits involved
in randomly selecting a jury from the pool at large).46 In other
words, both the entire complex of events within the trial and the
personalities of the jurors are distilled into this one variable.
Because a particular jury is merely a randomly drawn subset of
all the potential jurors, the probabilities of obtaining petit juries
with various fractions of conviction-prone members can be easily
calculated. Stated in another way, one fact is known about each
juror as he leaves the jury box to begin deliberation: The probabil-
ity that he believes the defendant to be guilty is exactly equal to the
value of ft. This one parameter determines the likelihood of a ma-
jority of jurors being conviction-prone, so that
! 6and
( , ( -f ) -, x i! (6 -0) ! a n
Me, ~- 12E,, =fl) ( , I" ' x (12 - i) !
Mt, 6 and Mt, 2a denote the probability that a majority4" of the petit
jurors that are drawn will be conviction-prone prior to deliberation.
As yet, this characterization says nothing about the verdicts. The
Mt formulations can be used to predict the final verdicts, however,
if the deliberation process is adequately described.
categorization. It seems unlikely, then, that there would be a sufficient number of purely
neutral persons to vitiate the assumption that "guilty-prone jurors" plus "acquittal-
prone jurors" equals nearly 100 percent. Moreover, the empirical evidence shows no
tendency for "neutrals" to emerge. See studies cited notes 50-59 inIra.
46 Of course, attorneys are not random in selecting jurors. The statistical approach
taken here is valid, however, because of the way the "pool" was defined. See note 43
supra.
47 The strict majority ignores all the equally divided juries (where there are three
and three, or six and six, favoring conviction and acquittal). These special cases will
be reckoned with later. See note 62 infra.
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B. The Deliberation Process
A verdict of guilty or innocent requires unanimity in nearly all
criminal cases. 48  To predict the verdicts on the basis of Mt, a con-
nection must be found between the initial position of the majority
and the final unanimous verdict that evolves through deliberation.
The Williams opinion refers to several studies to support the con-
tention that deliberation subjects the jurors in the minority to coer-
cive psychological pressures from the majority.4 But the Court fails
to draw from a large number of other studies that are much more
akin to jury deliberations. These studies suggest that the initial ma-
jority will persuade the minority to capitulate in a very large number
of the cases. This notion of "majority persuasion" is predicated up-
on many studies of small group behavior plus the relatively small
amount of empirical information concerning jury behavior per se:
(1). Experiments considering group persuasion and conformity
have always shown the majority to have an influence on the minor-
ity. The extent of the minority's capitulation is a function of many
variables such as group cohesiveness and group purpose, but even
very weak interactions among the members of the groups produce
some coercive effect.50
4 8 See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 138-39 (1970). The Court is deciding
whether unanimity is a constitutional requirement at the time of this writing. State v.
Johnson, 230 So.2d 825 (La.), prob. juris, noted, 400 U.S. 900 (1970) (No. 5161);
State v. Apodaca, 462 P.2d 691 (Ore. Ct. App. 1969), cert. granted, 400 U.S. 901
(1970) (No. 5338). The role of unanimity is discussed in note 70 infra.
4 9 H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 462-63, 488-89 (1966); Asch,
Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments, in
READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1952); Note, On Instructing Deadlocked Juries,
78 YALE L.J. 108, 110-11 (1968); C. Hawkins, Interaction and Coalition Realign-
ments in Consensus-Seeking Groups: A Study of Experimental Jury Deliberation, 13,
146, 156, Aug. 17, 1970 (unpublished thesis on file at Library of Congress).
5o See D. CARTWRIGHT & A. ZANDER, GROUP DYNAMICS 139-50 (3d ed. 1968);
Kelley & Thibaut, Experimental Studies of Group Problem Solving and Process, in
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 735, 767-68, 771-72 (G. Lindzey ed. 1954).
Some of the studies that have investigated group conformity and majority rule are: Asch,
Studies of Independence and Conformity: I. A. Minority of One Against a Unanimous
Majority, 70 PSYCHOL. MONOGR., No. 9 (1956) ("stooges" giving incorrect response
to perception of simple physical stimuli caused subject to change his opinion); Flament,
Processus d'Influence Sociale et Rgseaux de Communication, 6 PSYCHOL. FRANCAISE
115 (1961) (change of opinion of number of points of light seen in the experimental
apparatus); Flament, Influence Sociale et Perception, 58 ANNbE PSYCHOL. 377 (1958);
Gerard, The Effect of Different Dimensions of Disagreement on the Communication
Process in Small Groups, 6 HUM. RELAT. 249 (1953) (opinions of group members
were studied during discussions of hypothetical legislative bills); Jenness, Social Influ-
ences in the Change of Opinion, 27 J. ABNORM. SOC. PSYCHOL. 279 (1932) (estima-
tion of number of beans in a jar before and after group discussion); Luchins, Social
Influences on Perception of Complex Drawings, 21 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 257 (1945)
("stooges" interpretations of pictures affected views of subjects, who were children);
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(2). Experiments on group pressure have dealt with both com-
plex and simple stimuli. In some, conformity behavior has distinct-
ly occurred where the stimulus is simple - as in choosing which of
two lines is longer,51 or determining how many lights are visible on
a board. 2 Yet other studies indicate that a complex stimulus or the
possibility of a complex response produces an even greater tendency
to conform5 (possibly because the mental conceptualization of the
events is so malleable)." A criminal trial certainly provides such
complexity, and consequently majority persuasion should be especial-
ly pronounced.
(3). Where some factor intrudes to produce unusual pressures
towards conformity, the minority responds with a greater proclivity
to change sides.5 The charge by the judge and the jury's feeling
of a social duty to reach unanimity can create just this kind of pres-
sure56 and further increase the prevalence of majority persuasion.
(4). Certain types of group structures seem especially condu-
cive to uniformity phenomena. In particular, a group-centered dis-
cussion (rather than leader-centered) 57 or a group typified by par-
ticipatory leadership (rather than supervisory leadership) 58 evinces
Thorndike, The Effect of Discussion upon the Correctness of Group Decisions, When
the Factor of Majority Influence is Allowed For, 9 J. Soc. PsYCI-O. 343 (1938) (in-
dividual opinions on social and aesthetic issues were registered before and after group
discussion); Wheeler & Jordan, Change of Individual Opinion to Accord with Group
Opinion, 24 J. ABNORM. Soc. PSYCHOL. 203 (1929) (very weak, subtle majority
opinion influenced subjects' opinions on social policies).
51 See Asch, supra note 50.
52 See Flament, Processus d'Influence Sociale et Rtseaux de Communication, 6 PsY-
CHOL. FRANCAISE 115 (1961).
53 See Coleman, Task Difficulty and Conformity Pressures, 57 J. ABNOIM. SOC.
PSYCHoI. 120 (1958); Flament, Ambigutg du Stimulu, Inc&titude de la R6sponse, et
Processus d'Influence Sociale, 59 ANNA PSYCHOL. 73 (1959); Luchins, Social Influ-
ences on Perception of Complex Drawings, 21 J. Soc. PsYcHoL. 257 (1945).
54 See Flament, Aspects Rationnels et Ginitiques des Changements d'Opinions Sous
Influence Sociale, 3 PSYCHOL. FRANCAISE 186 (1958).
55 See Back, Influence Through Social Communication, 46 J. ABNoIm Soc. PsY'-
cHOL. 9 (1951); Festinger, Informal Social Communication, 57 PSYCHOL. REv. 271
(1950); Gerard, supra note 50.
56 The pressure to conform can be exerted on the jury by the judge's charge. The
famous Allen charge represents the outer limits of pressure acceptable in most courts.
See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501-02 (1896). The value of such pressure
must be balanced in the judge's mind against the value of letting a few jurors prohibit
a final condusion. The protection that may be afforded a defendant by such adamant
holdouts was stressed in Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 759 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 955 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
GT See Bovard, Group Structure and Perception, 46 J. ABNORM. SOC. PSYcHoL.
398 (1951).
GSSee Preston & Heintz, Effects of Participatory versus Supervisory Leadership on
Group Judgment, 44 J. ABNORM. Soc. PSYc-iOL 345 (1949).
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greater majority persuasion. There is no empirical evidence on the
matter, but it seems likely that the jury would be characterized by
both of the above structural typologies.
(5). The available evidence dealing directly with the jury cor-
roborates the hypothesis that deliberation generally obeys the rule of
majority persuasion. 9
The above studies demonstrate that majority persuasion typifies
jury deliberations.6" In fact, the study dealing specifically with the
jury shows that this behavior occurs in about 97 percent of all
cases.6 In any case where majority persuasion holds true, the pre-
59 The small percentage of hung juries in criminal trials is itself substantial evidence
of conformity behavior because it shows that unanimity was usually attained. Although
there is some uncertainty about the precise number of hung juries, a figure of 5.5 per-
cent seems to be fairly accurate. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 14, at 57 n.2.
The only empirical evidence obtained directly from an investigation of jury behavior
shows the prevalence of minority capitulation. In a sample of 225 criminal trials, the
minority position on the first ballot became the ultimate verdict in only 3 percent of
the cases; the jury was hung in an additional 4 percent of the cases. See Broeder,
The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744, 747-48 (1959) (these
figures are directly derived from Broeder's statistics). These first ballot votes were
taken "immediately," id. at 47, so they should fairly represent the jurors' predilections
just before deliberation (which is the point in time at which f, is defined).
60 More experimentation might be desirable to further investigate the deliberation
process.
There are several points that should be mentioned about the empirical studies used
to show the prevalence of majority persuasion:
(1) The studies performed outside of an actual trial context (see studies cited notes
49-57 supra) are not necessarily conclusive in jury situations. Because any num-
ber of factors could differentiate the performance of juries from other small groups,
the most persuasive data must come from studies of the jury itself.
(2) In the jury study, the pole of the jurors' opinions was taken "immediately." See
note 59 supra. But this point of time does not correspond exactly to that point
used in the model. The model assumed that no interaction whatsoever had oc-
curred when these predilections were ascertained (thus precluding any majority
persuasion effects). In the jury study data some slight interaction seems to have
occurred before the jurors were polled, although the experimenters do not describe
the circumstances in any detail. See Broeder, supra note 59, at 747. A more exact
study would be necessary to determine whether significant majority persuasion had
occurred before balloting.
(3) Majority persuasion was observed in about 93 percent of the cases in the jury
study (in 3 percent of the cases, the minority prevailed; in 4 percent the jury
hanged). See note 59 supra. The hung jury cases can be brought within the
scope of the model, see note 62 infra, but the few cases where the minority tri-
umphs remain anamolies. Even where minority persuasion prevails, however, the
different size juries would again yield different results since the probabilities of
various juror distributions would still depend on jury size.
(4) It has been assumed that each juror has some type of predilection that provides
a basis for classification. Thus, the guilty-prone plus the innocent-prone jurors
total 100 percent. See note 45 supra. This assumption is not contradicted by any
evidence, but it could be better corroborated.
Thus, the empirical basis is not absolutely conclusive. But it is very strong, and there
are no prohibitive deficiencies in the data.
61 See notes 59 supra & 62 infra.
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deliberation jury (characterized by Mt) can be directly related to the
final verdict.
C. The Probability of Conviction as a Function of ft
In a case where majority persuasion exists, the majority position
before deliberation evolves into the final, unanimous verdict. Con-
sequently, the probabilities of conviction for the two sizes of jury,
Pt, 6 and Pt, i2, are exactly the same as Mt, 6 and Mt, 2 if a correc-
tion is first made for those petit juries where the members initially
are equally split between conviction and acquittal."
Ps= Z (y(1-f-)' X i:(6_! + 2X3!3 (I,)'(I-f,)', and
(h)(I X 12! + 12!1P 11 Is. =/) ( -- i ' f - I! (12 - i)! 2 2X 6! 6! f ' -- O
i=7
The model is complete at this point, and quantitative results can
be obtained by calculating the formulas.63
62 There are two obvious ways to treat the cases where the initial jury feeling is
equally divided:
(1) assume each such case ends in a hung jury; or
(2) assume half the cases become guilty verdicts and the other half acquittals.
As has been stressed throughout this study, such assumptions are of little merit in the
absence of empirical verification. But even though there is scant evidence relating to
the problem of initially divided juries, the first possibility can be rejected because of
the results it yields. If each such case ended in a hung jury, a much greater number
of hangings would be expected than actually occur. (The mathematical explanation of
this fact is omitted because it becomes very involved.) Thus, the second assumption
appears more likely, simply through the process of elimination. The 10 cases where
there is evidence on this point agree exactly with the second assumption (five cases
become acquittals, five convictions). See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 14, at
488. Mathematically this assumption means
St,- 6! (f,)3 (1-ft) 3 and
2 X 3!3!
12!1St,,- (2 12 )U 6 (140)6,
2 X 6!6!
where St, 6 and St, ,2 denote the contribution to the conviction probabilities from these
special cases.
63 The model predicts no hung juries (as a consequence of the assumption of ma-
jority persuasion and the treatment given the initially split juries, see note 62 supra),
but this does not mean the results are inaccurate. A trial ending in a hung jury is not
dispositive of the defendant's case and this must be reflected in the model. The assump-
tion is that the defendant is retired if the jury hangs. The probabilities of conviction
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FIGURE 1
ft Values
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1.0
Pt, 1 0 1 6 161321 50 68 84 94 99 100
Pt, 1 0 0 1 8 25 150 75 92 99 100 100
0 .2 A4 .6 .8 1.0
f, Value
To use the table of probabilities, first locate the desired ft value
at the top. This parameter measures what fraction of all the po-
tential jurors would be guilty-prone if each one were to observe the
trial. The probability of convicting the defendant (expressed in
percent) with either size jury is located in the respective box below
- Pt, 6 and Pt, 12 - actually represent the ultimate likelihood of conviction after any
necessary retrials. The results of the model could be easily adjusted if a particular jur-
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the ft value. The graph is interpreted by first locating the ft value
on the horizontal axis. The conviction probability for either jury
is found by seeing what value on the vertical axis corresponds to the
desired ft point on the appropriate curve.
It is evident from these numerical results that serious differences
exist between the six- and 12-man juries. For nearly all values of
ft, the size of the jury is substantially related to the probability of
conviction. If ft is larger than .5, the defendant has a greater
chance of acquittal with a six-man jury; if it is less than .5, the six-
man jury increases the likelihood of conviction. For example, when
ft equals .4, use of the six-man jury increases the defendant's chances
of conviction from 25 percent to 32 percent, and when ft equals .2,
his chances of conviction are six times as great (6 percent versus 1
percent).
Thus, the Court's conclusion that both juries would return the
same verdict is erroneous. The number of jurors significantly affects
the likelihood of conviction, and all that remains is to evaluate this
functional difference in terms of the Williams test of constitution-
ality.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SIX-MAN JURIES
The holding in Williams is predicated upon a belief that juries
of six and 12 persons return the same verdicts. Because that pre-
mise is incorrect, the issue of constitutionality must be reevaluated
in light of the improved analysis of jury size that has been made
here. First, the functional results obtained for each particular trial,
t, will be extended to a more general level. Then these extended
results will be interpreted in terms of the jury's purpose and the
Court's test of constitutionality.
When the number of jurors is reduced from 12 to six, the de-
creased representation makes the defendant's fate more a matter of
the chance involved in selecting the petit jury. Consequently, the
actual verdict is less likely to reflect the opinion of a "representative
cross section of the community."6" Whether the defendant is ad-
versely affected by the reduced representation depends upon the
value of ft, but no connection has yet been made between ft values
and the defendant's original conduct. It has been emphasized, in
fact, that ft is exactly determined only after the courtroom proceed-
ings have unfolded and the jury is prepared to begin deliberation. 5
64 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
Or See text accompanying notes 43-46 supra.
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The complexity of the trial creates uncertainties in ft that are fully
eliminated only after the in-court proceedings are completed.
Nevertheless, it is justifiable to assume that each defendant may
be characterized in advance of his trial by a relatively narrow range
of ft values. This assumption only means that the conduct and
mental state of the accused at the time of the alleged crime are high-
ly correlated to his probability of conviction. In other words, the
uncertainties in the trial (those factors that are independent, or par-
tially independent of the defendant's original conduct and mental
state) are assumed to have only slight effects on the chances of con-
viction.6 Therefore, each defendant is associated with some small,
distinct range of ft values in advance of the trial (the average value
of this ft range will be denoted by fo), as well as being characterized
by an ft value after trial. From a general perspective, there are two
separate groups of defendants (those with values of f. less than .5,
and those with values of f. greater than .5) whose members are de-
termined solely by their out-of-court behavior, without looking to
the actual events that transpire in the trial. The quantitative re-
sults that have been obtained are still completely applicable -
simply takes the place of ft in the equations and figures 1 and 2.
This extended formulation is sufficient to permit an evaluation
of jury size in light of the purposes of the jury - an evaluation that
must be made before the Williams test can be applied. The jury
fulfills its role by interjecting community opinion into the legal pro-
cess. It is the province of the jury alone to decide the question of
guilt,6 7 and this issue is settled ideally when the opinion of the com-
munity is translated into the verdict.68 The role of the jury is im-
paired whenever the verdict becomes less representative.
66 No empirical proof of this assumption is offered here. The alternative - that a
strong correlation fails to exist between a defendant's conduct and his chances of con-
viction - seems too contrary to our concept of the legal system to warrant a lengthy
refutation here. If a strong correlation did not exist, it would mean that the courts
adjudged the defendant's guilt on a fairly random basis. This issue lies at a very basic
level of the legal process, and merits serious evaluation in a more general context than
that of the present study.
67 See generally Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968).
The issue of a judge pressuring the jury to return a verdict (rather than hang) was
discussed in note 56 supra. Several cases have dealt with a judge's encroachment on
the jury's task of returning the final verdict. For example, Starr v. United States, 153
U.S. 614 (1894), held that the judge cannot direct a verdict of conviction in a criminal
trial without violating the sixth amendment.
68The jury should be "a body truly representative of the community." Smith v.
Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940). In other words, the actual verdict returned should
be as close as possible to the typical verdict that would be returned by all the possible
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In terms of the present study the interrelationship of the verdicts
and the representation problem is straightforward. The fo value of
the defendant depicts the entire group of potential jurors (who pre-
sumably reflect the opinion of the community)6 9 from which the
petit jury is taken. f. is determined by the opinion each potential
juror would have on the question of guilt if he were to watch the
trial of the defendant. If the purposes of the jury are fulfilled, the
verdict must be a function only of the defendant's behavior and the
representative opinions of the community. The fo value must pre-
dict with absolute certainty whether the jury convicts or acquits."'
jury subsets of the full community if each one had viewed the trial.
A difficult question is what constitutes the full community. The court has found no
constitutional barrier to exclusions on the basis of citizenship, age, educational attain-
ment, intelligence, character, or judgement. See Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320,
332 (1970). Also, an exemption (rather than exclusion) that effectively eliminates
some class of persons from jury service is permissible. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S.
57 (1961) (affirmed conviction where state practice of exempting women yielded a
very small proportion of women in the jury pool). As exemplified by Hoyt, the Court
has been reluctant to impose strict cross-sectional requirements on any area other than
race. This approach is not necessarily bad, since the primary interest is to secure a ver-
dict representative of the community. A cross section on the basis of sex, occupation,
political views, or the like is not an end in itself, but only a means to the ultimate goal
of attaining representative verdicts. If one could show that women jurors tend to con-
vict differently than men, the Hoyt holding would be unjustifiable.
Once the problem of defining the community has been settled and the jury pool is
selected, the crucial question is how to ensure that the actual verdict is representative of
what would be the typical verdict. This problem is discussed in note 70 infra.
6 9 See notes 43, 68 supra.
70 After determining the requirements of a representative jury pool, there is still a
question of what the ideal trial would be to ensure the greatest likelihood of attaining
the ideal decision of the jury - a verdict typical of the verdicts that would be returned
by each subset of the pool. See note 68 supra. The ideal would be to perform the
trial over and over for each subset and actually take the typical verdict. This is clearly
a practical impossibility, but because majority persuasion typifies jury deliberations, we
can make practical approximations to the ideal. Whenever f < .5, the typical verdict
would be acquittal, and the converse is true when f. > .5. It is a simple consequence
of statistics that f. would be known more and more accurately as the number of persons
polled is increased. Thus, with one trial alone f. would be known more accurately if
the number of jurors were increased. In terms of figure 2, the goal is to "square-off"
the probability of conviction curve until the branch to the left of fo = .5 lies on the
bottom line where P 0 (so that acquittal is certain when f. < .5) and the branch
to the right of f. - .5 lies on the top where P = 1 (so that conviction is certain cer-
tain when f. > .5). Instead of being reduced from 12 jurors to six, the size of the jury
should be increased if its purpose is to be fulfilled. If the actual verdicts conformed to
this ideal, figure 2 would appear as on page 550.
The requirement of unanimity should also be evaluated. If the jury were increased
to about 25, one might guess that unanimity would be very difficult to attain. Even
for the traditional jury of 12, however, the value of unanimity seems questionable. In
only 7 percent of the cases studied was there any difference between the results rendered
under the requirement of unanimity and what would have occurred if a majority decision
had been taken as the verdict. In 3 percent of the cases, the result is especially signifi-
cant because the minority eventually prevailed (the remaining 4 percent ended with
hung juries). See Broeder, supra note 59, at 747-48. It is important to remember,
1971]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22: 529
As f. becomes less determinative of the verdict, the verdict is less
an expression of the opinion of the community. The representative
quality of the jury is impaired in exactly this manner when the jury
size is reduced because such a reduction makes f. less determinative
of the final outcome of the trial.7 ' The statistical fluctuations in the
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f. Value
however, that the data on majority persuasion in the deliberation process is not conclu-
sive. See note 60 supra. One could discuss the value of unanimity endlessly, but the
absence of empirical support would render such an analysis relatively worthless.
71 The discussion here emphasizes the harmful effects of the six-man jury that befall
those defendants for whom fo is less than .5. If the 12-man jury is retained this group
would have less chance of conviction, although the other group of defendants (those
with an 1. greater than .5) would be subjected to a higher chance of conviction. This
latter group, however, does not have a legitimate argument against the 12-man jury.
The mere fact that a jury of six would provide a greater chance of escaping conviction
is not meaningful by itself. A defendant seeking six jurors (since he believes his to
value to be greater than .5) would be basing his argument on a circumvention of the
role of the jury, not a fulfilment of its role. The jury should transform the opinion of
the community into the final verdict, but the smaller jury would reduce such a defen-
dant's chances of conviction only because it is less representative of the community and
thus more subject to deviations from the ideal verdict. The group of defendants with
an fo value less than .5 claims the right to 12 jurors on the grounds that their fate will
more likely be a true reflection of the community opinion and consequently a greater
fulfillment of the purposes of the jury trial.
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of chance - and less a product of his behavior and the community's
values - as the number of jurors is lowered.
Thus, a change to six jurors from the traditional number of 12
derogates from the goals of a trial by jury. The constitutionality
of the six-man jury depends upon how this fact fits into the test laid
down in Williams. This test requires a combined evaluation of his-
tory, purpose, and function. It looks
to other than purely historical considerations to determine which
features of the jury system, as it existed at common law, were pre-
served in the Constitution. The relevant inquiry... [is] the func-
tion which the particular feature [that is, the historical feature,
which here of course is the requirement of 12 jurors] performs
and its relation to the purposes of the jury trial.72
The Williams test dearly specifies that the operational signifi-
cance of size is critical to the constitutionality of the six-man jury.
There is no indication, however, of the weight that should be ac-
corded the functional difference between the six-man jury and the
traditional jury. Thus, one reading would preserve the historical
feature when its loss would detract from the purposes of the jury
in any way whatsoever. This reading of the test would clearly mean
that the six-man jury is unconstitutional. A second interpretation
would require some "substantial" impairment of these purposes be-
fore the historical precedent would become a constitutional require-
ment. If the latter reading is taken, the effect required to show a
substantial departure from the performance of the traditional jury
is as yet unknown. It has been shown, however, that six jurors
never fulfill the purpose of the jury as well as the 12 required at
common law. Over a large portion of the f. range, the six-man
jury significantly changes the probability of conviction and this
change invariably constitutes a derogation from the ideal, repre-
sentative verdict.7 3  Because of the vagueness of the Court's stan-
72399 U.S. at 99-100.
73 A completely rigorous assessment of substantiality requires knowledge of the rela-
tive number of defendants corresponding to each f. value. Otherwise, it cannot be
shown how many persons suffer a particular degree of prejudice. An accurate experi-
ment measuring fo by dealing directly with all available jurors would be extremely
complex, if possible at all. An excellent surrogate is to study the predilections of the
petit jurors, and then infer the relative frequency of various fo values. This procedure
is very accurate if a fairly large number of cases is used. The available data does not
completely subdivide the juror predilections, but it is sufficiently refined to allow a few
critical conclusions. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 14, at 487. Most im-
portantly, it can be inferred from the first ballot votes (the measure of the predilections
of the petit jurors) that a significant fraction of defendants are scattered through the
range where f. is greater than .0, but less than .5. Thus, the possibility of prejudice
1971]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22: 529
dard, it is still not clear whether these differences are substantial, but
a positive answer seems by far the most logical. If even greater
differences were required - differences such as might occur with a
jury of two or three persons - the correlaton between representa-
tive verdicts and actual verdicts would be quite low. fo would de-
termine the verdict with relatively little certainty, although ideally
it should do so with absolute certainty. The six-man jury lies mid-
way between this kind of total frustration and the performance of
the traditional jury - an area where the label of substantial seems
perfectly fitting.
Thus, the Williams test was misapplied. If the Court had
abided by the test it laid down, the six-man jury would have been
declared unconstitutional. Even if the requirement of substantiality
is read into the test, the smaller jury seems to be constitutionally
proscribed.
It is worthwhile at this point to comment on another important
consequence of the Court's test. The decision to use history as a
guideline for a functional analysis involves a great deal of discre-
tion and subjectivity on the part of the Justices.T4  And once laid
down, the Court's test essentially forecloses arguments from analo-
gous areas of the law. The constitutionality of the six-man jury
must be resolved within the rubric of the Williams test, and other
constitutional rulings are largely irrelevant. Only if Williams had
provided no other test in the place of a purely historical approach
to a defendant in this range is not just an abstract possibility, but a real and inevitable
consequence of using the six-man jury.
74 When a constitutional claim is raised, there is no guidance in the Constitution
to the type of test that should be applied. Consequently, the Justices have virtually
unrestrained latitude in choosing the appropriate test for the occasion. For example,
Chief Justice Marshall often used a strictly textual type of constitutional interpretation;
he would argue that a logical reading of the words alone demanded his conclusion. But
this type of interpretation is as ultimately ad hoc as any other. In Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), Chief Justice Marshall argued that if the Supreme Court's
appellate and original jurisdiction were not mutually exclusive, part of article III would
be meaningless. But he explicitly rejected this "self-evident" principle when the oc-
casion suited him. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 297-99 (1821).
Another example is the variety of tests under the due process clause of the 14th
amendment. In certain circumstances a statute will be upheld against a challenge under
the due process clause if the state can show any debatable basis for its value. See, e.g.,
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). In other cases the state must show a com-
pelling interest to justify its regulations. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965). Obviously these differences are read into the Constitution by the judges
alone. The 14th amendment provides only one standard, not an entire array of stan-
dards that vary according to the kind of case being decided.
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would other aspects of constitutional law provide the criteria for
deciding the case.75
There is one question, however, that falls outside the Court's
test, and that is whether a defendant must show actual harm in his
own case to secure reversal. In some cases, the Court has looked to
the facts for an indication of some actual prejudice to the petitioner
before reversing his conviction.76 In others, the conviction has been
examined in the abstract and reversed without proof of actual preju-
dice if the possibility of prejudice seemed sufficient. The difficulty
in making a persuasive showing of actual prejudice is a factor in the
Court's decision to waive the burden of such a showing. 78  A de-
fendant challenging the six-man jury has a valid claim of prejudice
only if his f. value is less than .5. In practice a large percentage of
defendants would have f. values less than .5,70 and consequently the
chances of prejudice are significant. But because of the complexity
of finding what f. value exists in a particular case, a defendant prob-
ably could not show convincingly that his value was less than .5. In
view of the high probability of prejudice and the practical difficul-
ties of proving prejudice in a given case, a defendant convicted by
a six-man jury should not have to show that his fo value was less
than .5 to obtain reversal. The requirement of showing actual harm
would be an unrealistic burden to thrust on the defendant in this
situation.
V. CONCLUSION
Williams provides the germ for a wide range of comments, but
the most salient question is the functional importance of jury size.
A functional analysis is clearly relevant to an evaluation of the po-
tential impact of the case, and is equally crucial to the Court's test
of constitutionality. The Court concluded that the six-man jury
would return the same verdicts as the traditional jury, but this con-
clusion is unsupportable. A thorough analysis shows that the prob-
lem of diminished representation requires a much more careful treat-
ment than that accorded it by the Court. A proper treatment of
7 5 The jury representation cases would be quite relevant under these circumstances.
See note 68 supra.
7 6 See, e.g., Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952).
7 7 See, e.g., Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
78 See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 578-80 (1965), (Warren, C.J., concurring).
70 This can be inferred from the existence of a significant number of trials where a
substantial portion of the petit jury was innocent-prone at the first ballot. See H. KAL-
VEN & H. ZESEL, supra note 4, at 487; cf. note 73 supra.
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representation, in conjunction with a description of the deliberation
process, shows that the six-man jury convicts different persons. This
difference is not a meaningless or arbitrary distinction, but reflects
a substantial derogation from the performance of the 12-man jury.
The test laid down in Williams indicates that the reduced jury is
unconstitutional if the smaller size impairs its performance. Conse-
quently, a correct application of the Court's test would hold that a
jury of six persons is unconstitutional.
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